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I. INTRODUCTION
"In her wildest dreams, Barbie could not have imagined herself
in the middle of Rule 11 proceedings."' However, in 2002, Mattel's
Barbie Doll found herself in the center of "acrimonious litigation."2
Attorney James Hicks brought suit on behalf of Harry Christian,
claiming that the Cool Blue Barbie infringed on the Christian
Claudene Doll's copyright.3 Hicks, however, had failed to discover that
Mattel designed Cool Blue Barbie six years before Christian's
Claudine Doll.4 In light of this egregious error, the Ninth Circuit held
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Hicks'
complaint frivolous under Rule 11. 5 Barbie breathed a sigh of relief-
Rule 11 effectively halted a frivolous claim and held an attorney
accountable for his lapse.
"In our adversary system, some lawyers will inevitably be
tempted to act unethically to further their clients' interests. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 places primary responsibility for policing
litigation related lapses in the hands of district court judges, and
confers on them great flexibility and discretion."6 Despite the Rule's
current importance, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 has modest
origins. Initially, the Rule required simply that attorneys sign all
pleadings, motions, and papers filed with the court.7 In response to
systemic abuses of the litigation process, the Supreme Court amended
the Rule in 1983 to serve a stronger policing function.8 Rule 1l's 1983
language required that attorneys make reasonable inquiries into facts
and law before filing, and it leveled sanctions against those attorneys
who failed to do soY This effort to bolster Rule l's force, however,
1. Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1123 (finding that Mattel copyrighted its "Cool Blue" doll six years before
Christian copyrighted the Claudene head sculpture).
5. Id. at 1121.
6. Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience: The Problem of Federal Appellate Courts, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 97, 132 (2006).
7. The original Rule 11 required that "[e]very pleading of a party represented by an
attorney ... be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address
shall be stated," and that "[a] party who is not represented by an attorney ... sign his pleading
and state his address." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938) (amended 1983).
8. See Theodore C. Hirt, A Second Look at Amended Rule 11, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1007, 1009-
12 (1999) (explaining that the pre- 1983 Rule 11 had not been effective in deterring abuses of the
litigation process). For a background discussion of the rule-making process, see generally
Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103-19 (2002).
9. Hirt, supra note 8, at 1009-10.
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swung too far in the opposite direction; after the 1983 amendments,
Rule 11 spawned a "cottage-industry" of sanction litigation. 10 To quash
excessive claims and endless litigation, the Court amended Rule 11
once more in 1993.11
Today, the Rule's tripartite structure highlights its three
functions.12 Rule 11(a) requires attorneys to sign all papers filed with
10. Id. at 1010 ("Some commentators criticized the Rule as generating a veritable 'cottage
industry' of sanctions practice, spawning satellite litigation that was encouraged by the Rule's
provisions, which authorized litigants to recover attorneys' fees for pursuing sanctions
motions."). But see George Cochran, Happy (?) Birthday Rule 11: The Reality of 'A Last Victim"
and Abuse of the Sanctioning Power, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 691, 691-92 (2004) (arguing that
attorney charges of Rule 11 inundating courts with "frivolous lawsuits" remain unproven).
11. Hirt, supra note 8, at 1010-12. The Rule was again amended on December 1, 2007;
however, these changes are merely stylistic. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes
(2007) ("The language of Rule 11 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil
Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent
throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only."). To maintain consistency
with the cases cited herein, this Note continues to reference the 1993 version of Rule 11.
12. For reference, the Rule is reproduced here in toto:
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Representations to Court;
Sanctions
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not
represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the
signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by
affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is
corrected promptly after being called to the attention of attorney or party.
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances,-
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically
so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the
conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law
firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from
other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate
subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:2:615
the court. 13 Rule 11(b) prohibits attorneys from submitting filings
made with "any improper purpose," offering " 'frivolous' arguments,"
or asserting "factual allegations without 'evidentiary support' or the
'likely' prospect of such support."'14 Finally, Rule 11(c) allows the court,
either on its own motion or on an opposing party's, to impose
"appropriate" sanctions on attorneys who have violated 11(a) or (b). 15
Significantly, the 1993 amendments included a "safe harbor"-if an
opposing party seeks sanctions, it must first serve its Rule 11 motion
on the adversary without filing the motion or otherwise bringing it to
the attention of the court.' 6 The served party has twenty-one days to
fix the problem, and disputes come before the court only if a party
refuses to correct or withdraw a disputed filing within the twenty-one
days. 17 Only if an attorney refuses to correct a dispute in this time and
presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other
period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention,
allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the
court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and
attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional
circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed by
its partners, associates, and employees.
(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an
attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with
respect thereto.
(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable
conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A)
and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature,
an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for
effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the
reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the
violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a
violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court
issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims
made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined
to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to Discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply
to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are
subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(a).
14. Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting FED. R. Cry. P.
11(b)).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
16. See id.; see also Young, 404 F.3d at 39 (discussing the difference between party-initiated
and court-initiated Rule 11 motions in terms of the "safe harbor" provision).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c); Young, 404 F.3d at 39.
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only upon a finding of "objective unreasonableness"-"i.e., liability
may be imposed if the lawyer's claim to have evidentiary support is
not objectively reasonable"l'8 -may courts issue sanctions. This
solution allows attorneys to self-police, easing the burden of excessive
Rule 11 litigation on courts.
Importantly, Rule 11 permits judges to initiate sua sponte
sanction proceedings. However, these sanction proceedings frequently
lack the twenty-one day "safe harbor" provided for attorney-initiated
sanctions, and courts disagree as to the mens rea standard an
attorney must exhibit to warrant judge-initiated sanctions. In 2003,
the Second Circuit held that where there is no twenty-one-day "safe
harbor," the appropriate standard for judge-initiated sanction
invocation should be "subjective bad faith."19 That is, as long as a
judge determined that an attorney acted in good faith, a district court
judge could not issue sanctions-even if a judge classified the
attorney's behavior as objectively unreasonable. To bolster this
interpretation, the Second Circuit drew on the "Advisory Committee's
expectation that court-initiated sanction proceedings will ordinarily be
used only in situations that are 'akin to a contempt of court.' "20 While
the Second Circuit is currently the only court to adopt this "subjective
bad faith" standard, several other courts appear to be moving in that
direction. 21 The First Circuit, however, is among those courts rejecting
the Second Circuit's bad faith requirement. In Young v. City of
Providence, the court determined that the liability standard for judge-
initiated sanctions is the same as that for attorney-initiated
sanctions-objective unreasonableness. 22 The Young court specifically
18. In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Ted Lapidus, S.A. v.
Vann, 112 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1997)).
19. Id. at 87.
20. Id. at 90. Reference to two cases illustrates the difference between "good faith" and "bad
faith." An example of an attorney's bad faith actions can be found in MHC Investment Co. v.
Racom Corp., where the court found that an attorney deliberately filed motions to impede the
trial's progress. 323 F.3d 620, 621-27 (8th Cir. 2003). An example of an attorney's negligent but
"good faith" action can be found in In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, where the attorneys relied on
their client's word that he had not fraudulently created documents. 323 F.3d at 87. There, the
court found that while the attorneys may have believed their client when logic dictated
otherwise, they had not deliberately misled the court. Id.
21. See Sherry, supra note 6, at 137 (interpreting Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331
F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2003); MHC Investment Co. v. Racom Corp., 323 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 2003);
and Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2002), as adopting heightened
standards of review for sanctions imposed sua sponte).
22. 404 F.3d at 40 (noting that the specific purpose of the 1993 revision was to reject a bad
faith requirement); see also Jenkins v. Methodist Hosps. of Dallas, 478 F.3d 255, 264 (5th Cir.
2007) ("[An attorney's good faith will not, by itself, protect against the imposition of Rule 11
sanctions.").
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noted that "nothing in the language of Rule 11(c) says that, if the court
initiates the inquiry, something more than a Rule 11(b) breach of duty
is required."23
The distinction between these standards is no small issue. Rule
11 sets the bar for attorney behavior, and confusion among lower
courts results in confusion among attorneys. Judges worry that too
strict an adherence to the Rule will chill effective advocacy; 24 however,
judges must remain cognizant that too forgiving an interpretation will
open the floodgates to attorney abuses.
Notwithstanding the Rule's importance and the 1983 and 1993
amendments, the appropriate attorney liability standard for judge-
issued sanctions remains elusive.25 Should Rule 11 punish and deter
knowing rule violations or aim to deter attorney carelessness? This
Note contends that judges must have the discretion to deter
negligence as well as punish bad faith-to decide otherwise permits
attorney behavior that is harmful to the profession's reputation and
discourages law firms from seeking the necessary institutional
reforms to deter careless error.
Of course, there are multiple approaches to strengthening Rule
ll's force: for example, courts could apply harsher sanctions or
sanction more frequently. This Note, however, argues that
interpreting Rule 11 broadly to allow judges to sanction both
negligence and bad faith is the easiest and most effective way to
strengthen the rule. The Note draws on recent tort research indicating
that it is both desirable and possible to deter attorney negligence.
Moreover, federal judges are especially well-suited to police the
profession because of their unique position in our legal system. As
such, the Advisory Committee or the Supreme Court should adopt the
First Circuit's "objective unreasonableness" standard.
In order to put Rule l1's current incarnation in perspective,
Part II focuses on the Rule's history and highlights the Advisory
Committee's continued struggle to articulate liability standards. Part
III analyzes the Circuits' diverse interpretations of the liability
standard for judge-initiated sanction proceedings. Part IV argues that
Rule 11 should police both bad faith and negligence and draws on
23. Young, 404 F.3d at 39.
24. See, e.g., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584, 587-88 (9th Cir.
1987) (discussing the " 'understandable' concern of the bar that vigorous advocacy not be
chilled").
25. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIviL PROCEDURE 11, at 10-16 (1989) (explaining that while
courts "have agreed that deterrence is the most important goal of amended Rule 11," they cannot
agree on what liability standard to apply).
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recent tort law studies indicating that legal rules can effectively deter
negligence where a regulatory framework, like the bar, is already in
place. Deterring negligence is not only possible, but desirable, and
courts "on the front lines of litigation" are singularly well-positioned to
do so. 26
II. THE MANY PERMUTATIONS OF RULE 11
A. 1938: Rule I1's Modest Roots
In 1938, Rule 11 debuted as a minor procedural rule frequently
overlooked by attorneys and courts alike.27 The Rule " 'consolidated
and unified' two previous Equity Rules-Rule 24 on 'Signature of
Counsel' and Rule 21 on 'Scandal and Impertinence.' "28 The original
Rule 11 placed "on the attorney the burden of ensuring that the
pleadings were accurate."29  Attorneys certified the pleadings'
reasonableness, and courts could strike "sham" pleadings. 30 To prove a
violation by opposing counsel, courts demanded a showing of
subjective bad faith 31 This high standard provided attorneys with
viable defenses if they proved good faith reliance on their client's
statements or their understanding of the law. 32 Even when the court
found bad faith, the Rule did not require the court to issue sanctions. 33
As a result, "courts rarely used [Rule 11] as a basis for sanctioning
lawyers."34
26. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) (discussing the court's
ability to control the behavior of the litigants before it).
27. Hirt, supra note 8, at 1009.
28. Id. The Federal Equity Rules pre-dated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1822, the Equity Rules contained "thirty-three very
concise rules of practice and procedure. A few of the rules were mandatory, but most generously
accorded federal judges with broad discretionary authority." Thomas 0. Main, Traditional Equity
and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 469 (2003).
29. Debbie A. Wilson, Note, The Intended Application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11:
An End to the "Empty Head, Pure Heart" Defense and a Reinforcement of Ethical Standards, 41
VAND. L. REV. 343, 349 (1988).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 943,
945-53 (1992).
34. Id. at 946.
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The good faith loophole doomed Rule 11's ability to deter
abuses in the litigation process. 35 Moreover, judges and attorneys did
not agree as to the circumstances that triggered sanctions; 36 the
subjective standard of conduct was ambiguous. And judges were
unsure about the types of sanctions they could issue.37 As the 1983
Advisory Committee notes explained, "[e]xperience shows that in
practice Rule 11 [was] not ... effective in deterring abuses. ' 38 The
Advisory Committee began exploring ways to increase the Rule's
relevance and utility. The 1983 amendments provided Rule 11 with
bite, but, as the next section will demonstrate, they swung it too far in
the opposite direction.
B. 1983 Amendments: Objective Reasonableness
The Rule's ineffectiveness compelled the Supreme Court to
amend Rule 11 in 1983. 39 The 1983 version shifted the inquiry away
from what an attorney "claimed to know" when filing court papers and
focused the court instead on what an attorney "should have known"
when filing.40 The judiciary caused this shift by revising the Rule's
standard of conduct: whereas the old Rule articulated an ambiguous
standard requiring that an attorney have "good ground to support"
papers filed with the court, the new Rule demanded "reasonableness
under the circumstances."41 The updated Rule permitted courts to
impose monetary sanctions and attorneys' fees. 42 Finally, sanctions
under the new Rule were mandatory rather than discretionary,
instructing that courts "shall impose" sanctions on attorneys found to
violate the standard. 43 Thus, the 1983 amendments dramatically
expanded the Rule's scope and application.
35. Cf. Hirt, supra note 8, at 1009 (stating that the Rule's ineffectiveness was partially
attributed to confusion about the proper standard of conduct expected of attorneys).
36. Id.
37. See BURBANK, supra note 25, at xix (discussing the ineffectiveness of Rule 11, and
explaining some of the confusing factors, including the range of available and appropriate
sanctions).
38. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983).
39. Hirt, supra note 8, at 1010.
40. Marshall et al., supra note 33, at 948.
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983) (noting that the new standard is
"more focused").
42. Id. (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980), and Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1, 5 (1973), as examples of cases in which an equivalent equitable doctrine had been
developing).
43. Id.
[Vol. 61:2:615
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Despite the 1983 amendments' clarifications, Rule l1's liability
standards remained ambiguous. The Rule's text seemed to impose
only two duties: (1) that attorneys make a subjectively reasonable
inquiry ensuring that their submissions were grounded in fact and
"warranted by existing law" and (2) that attorneys reflect "upon the
results of that inquiry" to form their conclusion about the
submissions. 44 However, some courts interpreted the rule as imposing
a third duty-to sign papers only if a "reasonably competent attorney"
would conclude, after inquiry into law and facts, that the submission
was appropriate. 45 Notwithstanding the Rule's silence on the matter,
courts "widely embraced" an interpretation requiring that the
attorney's inquiry itself be objectively reasonable. 46
In addition to criticizing Rule l's ambiguity regarding
attorneys' duties, the amendment's detractors worried that the
expanded Rule exacerbated the time, cost, and amount of litigation.
While the Advisory Committee anticipated that Rule 11 claims would
settle quickly at the close of the litigation or during a motion decision,
critics envisioned extensive "satellite litigation," spawning an entire
"cottage industry" of litigation focusing only on Rule 11 violations. 47
Even more troubling, critics expressed concern that the Rule chilled
"zealous but legitimate advocacy," "hinder[ed] developments in the
law," "poison[ed] relationships between lawyers and their clients,
lawyers and other lawyers, and lawyers and judges," and
disproportionately affected the poor. 48  However, despite these
criticisms, most attorneys acknowledged that the 1983 amendments
effectively stemmed attorney misbehavior. 49
Although the 1983 Rule successfully halted attorney
misbehavior, court dockets swelled with Rule 11 litigation. 50 Litigants
44. BURBANK, supra note 25, at 15.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 14; see also Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1986)
("[T]he conclusion drawn from the research undertaken must itself be defensible."); Eastway
Constr. Co. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[S]anctions shall be imposed
against an attorney... where, after reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could not form a
reasonable belief that the pleading is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law.").
47. Hirt, supra note 8, at 1010.
48. BURBANK, supra note 25, at 4.
49. See Jeff Goland, Note, In Re Pennie & Edmonds: The Second Circuit Returns to a
Subjective Standard of Bad Faith for Imposing Post-Trial Sua Sponte Rule 11 Sanctions, 78 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 449, 459 (2004) ("Both proponents and critics of the 1983 version agreed that the
rule had a positive effect in deterring some litigation conduct because attorneys were required to
'stop and think' before filing papers.").
50. Cf. Kim M. Rubin, Has a "Kafkaesque Dream" Come True? Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11: Time for Another Amendment, 67 B.U. L. REV. 1019, 1036, 1040 n.142 (1987)
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used Rule 11 as a discovery device, attempting to uncover the factual
basis for opponents' claims 51 and, even more troubling, threatened
sanction motions "to bully an opponent into withdrawing a paper or
position."52 By the early 1990s, it was clear that Rule 11 needed
further amendment. 53
C. 1993 Amendments: A Safe Harbor
In response to the excessive litigation, the Advisory Committee
amended the Rule in 1993 both substantively and procedurally, and
the 1993 amendment's substance still stands today.54 The new Rule
eliminated mandatory sanctions. Rule 11 affords district court judges
discretion to decide whether sanctions are appropriate.55 The primary
procedural change created a "safe-harbor" procedure giving "putative
[attorney] violators the opportunity to withdraw challenged papers."56
Attorneys cannot bring a Rule 11 violation to the court's attention
unless they first challenge opposing counsel to withdraw the suspect
submission.57 An accused attorney has twenty-one days "to withdraw
that position or to acknowledge candidly that [he or she does] not
currently have evidence to support a specified allegation."58 It is only
when an attorney does not withdraw her submission that opposing
counsel may bring the matter to the court's attention.
In addition to providing the twenty-one day safe harbor, the
new amendments clarified courts' ability to initiate sua sponte
sanction proceedings. 59 Although the amendments do not describe the
circumstances permitting court sanction, the Advisory Committee
Notes indicate that these sanctions "will ordinarily be issued only in
situations that are akin to a contempt of court."60 Thus, although the
(discussing Judge William Schwarzer's critique that a subjective bad faith standard under Rule
11 "crowds the dockets").
51. GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PERSPECTIVES, AND
PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 14 (Richard G. Johnson ed., 3d ed. 2004).
52. Id. at 24.
53. Id. at 15 ("In July 1990, the Advisory Committee responded to continued criticisms of
Rule 11 by announcing a Call for Comments about the Rule and Public Hearings.")
54. Goland, supra note 49, at 461.
55. VAIRO, supra note 51, at 32 (noting that the new rule "was a signal to courts and
litigants that they should be less zealous in using Rule 11 in cases where there were relatively
minor infractions of the rule"); Goland, supra note 49, at 461-62.
56. Hirt, supra note 8, at 1017.
57. VAIRO, supra note 51, at 33.
58. Hirt, supra note 8, at 1018 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993)).
59. Rule 11(c)(1)(B) explicitly states that courts have the ability to impose sua sponte
sanctions. Hirt, supra note 8, at 1020-21.
60. Id. at 1021 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993)).
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amended Rule provides a "safe harbor" in the face of opposing
counsel's attack, attorneys remain subject to censure by judicial
imposition of sua sponte sanctions without a safe harbor.
Some courts concluded that where the provision addressing
judge-initiated sanctions lacks a "safe harbor," judges should issue
sanctions only in the face of deliberate Rule 11 violations. 61 Other
courts concluded that, because the Rule does not explicitly state that
attorney liability standards are different when issued by judges,
judges can continue to issue sanctions in the face of negligent and
deliberate Rule violations. 62 Thus, "[t]he specific issue is whether the
lawyer's liability for the sanction requires a mental state of bad faith
or only objective unreasonableness in circumstances where the lawyer
has no opportunity to withdraw or correct the challenged
submission."63 Courts divide in their answers, with some circuits
relying on the Advisory Committee Notes and others seeking guidance
from the text.
1. Empty Head, Pure Heart: Courts Interpret the New Amendments
In In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, the Second Circuit articulated
a subjective bad faith standard for judge-initiated sanctions.64 The
underlying case began as "relatively mundane trademark litigation."65
Two New York City restaurants began selling pasta sauce with
similar labels, and plaintiffs brought suit claiming the defendant's
pasta label infringed on their trademark. 66  The defendant,
represented by the New York law firm Pennie & Edmonds, countered
that he had used the disputed label since 1993, before the plaintiffs
began marketing their pasta sauce. 67 As evidence, the defendant
submitted a "1993" copy of his label and a "1993" invoice from his
printer.68 The plaintiffs discredited these documents by showing that
neither the documents' bar code nor the printer's area code existed in
61. See, e.g., In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that for
sua sponte sanctions "the appropriate standard is subjective bad faith").
62. See, e.g., Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[W]e think
mistaken any inference that this language requires malign subjective intent.").
63. Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 87.
64. Id.
65. Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 98 CIV 10175(JSM), 2002 WL 59434, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002). For the sake of simplicity, both the district court and the appellate
proceeding will be referred to hereinafter as the "Pennie & Edmonds" court or decision in the text
of this Note.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *1-2.
68. Id. at *2.
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1993.69 The Pennie & Edmonds attorneys confronted their client, who
claimed that he mistakenly submitted a 1999 copy of his pasta label
and that the printer, unable to locate the originals, had provided the
fraudulent invoice without informing the defendant that it was a
reconstruction instead of an original copy. 70 As proof of his innocence,
the client furnished his attorneys with an affidavit purportedly signed
by the printer admitting the error. 71 Pennie & Edmonds attorneys
contacted the printer, who denied doing business with the defendant
in 1993.72 Instead of admitting its client's deception, however, Pennie
& Edmonds filed for summary judgment, maintaining that its client
had marketed his pasta under the disputed label since 1993 and that
it submitted the materials in good faith.7 3 When confronted, the
attorneys claimed they had acted with a pure heart in reliance on
their client's statements. 74
Based on this evidence, the district court sanctioned Pennie &
Edmonds. 75 The circuit court, however, vacated the sanctions, finding
that, because the attorneys acted with what some have called a "pure
heart," they complied with Rule 11.76 The court held that, in the
absence of a "safe harbor" provision, judges should issue sanctions sua
sponte "only in more egregious circumstances," 77  basing this
conclusion on "the Advisory Committee's expectation that court-
initiated sanction proceedings will ordinarily be used only in
situations that are 'akin to a contempt of court.' "78 The court hesitated
to require more, worrying "that lawyers [would] sometimes withhold
submissions that they honestly believe have plausible evidentiary
support for fear that a trial judge, perhaps at the conclusion of a
contentious trial, will erroneously consider their claimed belief to be
69. Id.
70. In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 2003).
71. Id. "According to [the defendant], [the printer] took it upon himself to fabricate the
records because he no longer had his records from 1993, and he did not tell this to [the
defendant]." Patsy's Brand, Inc., 2002 WL 59434, at *2.
72. Patsy's Brand, Inc., 2002 WL 59434, at *3.
73. Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
74. Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 93.
75. Patsy's Brand, Inc., 2002 WL 59434, at *10 (requiring "that a partner of the firm submit
to the Court an affidavit stating that a copy of [the] Opinion has been delivered to each of the
lawyers in the firm with a memorandum that states that it is firm policy that its partners and
associates adhere to the highest ethical standards and that if a lawyer's adherence to those
standards results in the loss of a client, large or small, the lawyer will not suffer any adverse
consequence").
76. See Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 93 (holding that where the "lawyers acted with
subjective good faith, the Rule 11 sanction must be vacated").
77. Id. at 89-90.
78. Id. at 90.
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objectively unreasonable."79 While the district court judge had argued
that courts bear responsibility for "weeding out abuses," the Court of
Appeals concluded that an "objective" standard "risk[ed] more damage
to the robust functioning of the adversary process than the benefit it
would achieve. °80 Thus, because the Second Circuit worried more
about the risk of stifling creative lawyering and zealous advocacy than
about checking negligence, it concluded that Rule 11 sua sponte
sanctions required a finding of subjective bad faith.
The court limited its holding to situations where the court does
not afford the attorney a safe harbor; however, as Section III.A will
discuss, the court's cabining of its holding is mostly illusory.
2. Trend Spotting: The Move Towards a Bad Faith Standard
The Pennie & Edmonds court supported its interpretation of
the 1993 Amendments by noting that other circuits drew similar
conclusions from the Advisory Committee's "akin to contempt"
language.81 The court specifically highlighted the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery.8 2 There, the Fourth
Circuit overturned the district court's imposition of sanctions, noting
that "[t]he Advisory Committee contemplated that a sua sponte show
cause order would only be used 'in situations that are akin to a
contempt of court.' "3 The Hunter court noted that the sanctioned
attorney's claims were not frivolous, but merely an attempt to resolve
an ambiguous legal question in her client's favor.8 4 Although the
decision did not explicitly address the mens rea standard for a judge-
initiated sanction, the Pennie & Edmonds court cited this case as
demonstrating that "the Advisory Committee's 'akin to contempt'
standard is applicable to sanction proceedings initiated by a court.
8s5
Because the Fourth Circuit interpreted the Advisory Committee's
language as creating a distinction between judge-initiated and
attorney-initiated sanctions, the decision implies that a judge should
require a higher standard than negligence in the former case.
The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits appear to be following the
Second Circuit's path. They too have required a finding of heightened
79. Id. at 91.
80. Id. at 93.
81. Id. at 90 ("[T]he Advisory Committee's 'akin to contempt' standard is applicable to
sanction proceedings initiated by a court ... .
82. 281 F.3d 144, 151 (4th Cir. 2002).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 156-57.
85. Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 90.
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negligence before imposing Rule 11 sanctions. For example, in MHC
Investment Co. v. Racom Corp., the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district
court's sanction imposition.8 6 MHC Investment Company originally
sued Racom for breach of contract.87 Racom filed several affirmative
defenses, such as claiming that the contract lacked consideration, and
filed counterclaims against MHC for fraud, slander, and breach of
fiduciary duty.88  Finding that their affirmative defenses and
counterclaims constituted "frivolous defenses" brought for the
"purpose of delaying payment to MHC," the district court sanctioned
Racom's attorneys.8 9 On review, the Eighth Circuit highlighted that
Rule 11
is applied with particular strictness where, as here, the sanctions are imposed on the
court's own motion. In that circumstance-unlike the situation in which an opposing
party moves for Rule 11 sanctions-there is no "safe harbor" in the Rule allowing
attorneys to correct or withdraw their challenged filings.
9 0
The court's decision to highlight the Rule's strictness when
there is no safe harbor indicated its reluctance to apply Rule 11 to
negligence. In that instance, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
sanctions, noting that "the behavior was not a single incident[;] the
Racom attorneys established a pattern of persisting in these claims
over the course of two separate resistances to summary judgment
motions, as well as two separate attempts to extend those proceedings
without offering valid reasons to do so."91 Holding that the district
court had not abused its discretion in determining that the attorneys'
behavior constituted "bad faith,"92 the court avoided addressing
whether sua sponte sanctions can be imposed in cases of attorney
negligence; however, its language implies it will apply a "bad faith"
standard in future cases. 93
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit, in Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler,
followed the Second Circuit in reading Rule 11 to impose a bad faith
standard on judge-imposed sanctions. 94 The district court imposed
86. 323 F.3d 620, 621 (8th Cir. 2003).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 623.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 627.
92. See id. at 626 (holding that the district court did "not err in deciding that [the law firm]
used the claims and defenses for the purpose of delaying" its client's payment of money owed to
the plaintiff).
93. See id. at 623 (noting that where there is no "safe harbor," courts must review sua
sponte sanction impositions with "particular strictness").
94. 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003) ("Other circuits apply the 'akin to contempt'
rationale to court-initiated Rule 11 sanctions.").
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sanctions against DaimlerChrysler's counsel for filing a motion in
limine to prevent opposing counsel's mention of "World War II, Adolph
Hilter [sic], the Nazis, slave labor, concentration camps, gas chambers,
or any other inflammatory aspect of German history."95
DaimlerChrysler presumably worried that plaintiffs would denigrate
DaimlerChrysler, a German company, by linking Germany to World
War II and Nazi atrocities. The district court judge noted, "There is
absolutely nothing in the record to indicate that Plaintiffs have or
intend to muddy the issues in this case," and imposed sanctions
against DaimlerChrysler's attorneys for a "frivolous" motion. 96 Citing
Pennie & Edmonds, the Eleventh Circuit overturned the lower court's
sanction imposition. 97 In dicta, the court agreed with Pennie &
Edmonds' "subjective bad faith" standard for judge-initiated
sanctions. 98 However, the court never applied the standard because it
overturned for procedural reasons. 99 To date, no other court has
applied this standard.
3. Objective Unreasonableness: The First Circuit Articulates an
Objective Standard
In Young v. City of Providence, the First Circuit rejected the
Pennie & Edmonds court's "empty head, pure heart" approach in favor
of an objective liability standard. 100 The original litigation involved
two police officers who, in the course of responding to a reported
disturbance, shot and killed an off-duty officer attempting to assist
them.101 The deceased officer's mother sued the police officers for
killing her son. 0 2 Before trial, the plaintiffs attorney created a
diagram to demonstrate the officers' movements throughout the
evening. 0 3 However, video footage of the area filmed by a local
television station indicated that the diagram was inaccurate. 10 4 After
arguing the diagram's admissibility, both sides signed a stipulation
95. Id. at 1253 (quoting the district court judge's in limine order).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1255-57.
98. See id. at 1256 (agreeing with circuits that review sua sponte sanctions with "particular
stringency," but excusing itself from resolving the issue in the case at bar).
99. Id. at 1257 (finding a "material variance" between the lower court's show cause order
(for the "Nazi" motion) and the eventual stated reasons for imposing sanctions (excessive in
limine motions)).
100. 404 F.3d 33, 40 (lst Cir. 2005).
101. Id. at 35.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 36.
104. Id.
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that the diagram was inaccurate.10 5 Later, however, the plaintiffs
attorney re-evaluated the film and concluded that it did not
necessarily indicate the diagram's inaccuracy. 10 6 As a result, the
plaintiff sought relief from the stipulation, claiming a mistake. 0 7 The
plaintiffs memo accused the court of ordering her to sign the
stipulation. 0 8 After issuing a show cause order, the court imposed
Rule 11 sanctions on plaintiffs attorneys for misrepresenting the
court's role in the stipulation agreement. 09
The sanctioned attorneys appealed, and the First Circuit
reversed the sanctions, articulating an objective mens rea standard. 110
Relying on Rule l's text, the court noted that the Rule sets out "the
substantive obligations of counsel (e.g., that factual claims must have
evidentiary support or a likely prospect of it) without in any way
suggesting that the substantive obligations differ depending on
whether a later claim of violation is raised by opposing counsel or the
court.""' Unlike the Second Circuit, this court determined that the
1993 amendments' overall purpose was to "eliminate any 'empty-head
pure-heart' justification for patently frivolous arguments."1 2 While
the court noted that the "wheels of justice would grind to a halt if
lawyers everywhere were sanctioned every time they made unfounded
objections, weak arguments, and dubious factual claims," it
simultaneously highlighted that "opposing counsel has far greater
incentive than the trial judge to invoke Rule 11 for slight cause."1 3
The First Circuit's decision evinces trust in both district court
judges and appellate court supervision. While the court worried that
too strict an interpretation of Rule 11 would quash zealous advocacy,
it concluded that the solution is careful appellate review, not limited
judicial discretion.11 4 However, the appellate court reversed the
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. "The main thrust of plaintiff's argument in the motion and memoranda was that
plaintiff had entered into the stipulation under circumstances that created a 'manifest injustice,'
and that the agreement was made under a clear mistake." Young v. City of Providence, 301 F.
Supp. 2d 187, 192 (D.R.I. 2004) (quoting the plaintiffs "corrected memorandum" in support of
her 'Motion Requesting to be Relieved from the Stipulation Regarding Exhibit 18[A]") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
108. Young, 404 F.3d at 36-37.
109. Id. The sanction order noted that "[tihe Court never informed plaintiff she had to agree
to defendant's version of the stipulation." Young, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
110. Young, 404 F.3d at 40-41.
111. Id. at 39.
112. Id. at 40.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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district court's sanction imposition, finding that the memo adequately
portrayed the trial court's role in the stipulation.115 Thus, the court's
analysis regarding mens rea standards cannot be used as precedent.
Recently, however, the Fifth Circuit explicitly held in Jenkins
v. Methodist Hospitals of Dallas, Inc., that "an attorney's good faith
will not, by itself, protect against the imposition of Rule 11
sanctions."116 In Jenkins, the district court sanctioned an attorney for
including racially inflammatory language in his brief.11 7 Despite the
attorney's protestations that the "statement at issue was an
inadvertent mistake and not the result of serious misconduct," the
appeals court affirmed the sanction imposition.118 The court noted that
"district courts are 'on the front lines of litigation,' " and, as such,
appellate courts should review sanction imposition deferentially.11 9
Although the court did not engage in an in-depth analysis of either the
Rule's text or the Advisory Committee Notes, its conclusion evinces
sympathy for the Rule's objectives and an understanding that a strict
interpretation is necessary for the Rule to be effective.
III. INTERPRETING RULE 11
A. The Second Circuit: A Misguided Approach to Rule 11
The Pennie & Edmonds court examined Rule l's 1993
amendments and determined that the Advisory Committee sought to
"restore the pre-1983 standard of subjective bad faith for post-trial,
sua sponte Rule 11 sanctions."1 20 The court based this conclusion on
Advisory Committee language indicating that courts should impose
sanctions in situations "akin to contempt," and provides the twenty-
one-day "safe harbor" only for sanctions initiated by opposing
115. Id.
116. 478 F.3d 255, 264 (5th Cir. 2007) (emphasis omitted).
117. Jenkins v. Methodist Hosps. of Dallas, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-1823-M, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25131, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2004). Lead counsel for the plaintiff in Jenkins made a "serious
misrepresentation of the factual record" by inserting the epithet "Boy" before the statement,
attributed to one of the defendants by plaintiff in his affidavit, "I would not let you treat my dog,"
despite the lack of any evidence in the record that the defendant used that, or any other, epithet
in making that statement. Id.
118. Jenkins, 478 F.3d at 263, 266 (emphasis omitted).
119. Id. (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990)).
120. Goland, supra note 49, at 466 (citing In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 91 n.4
(2d Cir. 2003)).
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counsel. 121 Thus, the court concluded that because judge-imposed
sanctions lacked a "safe harbor," the Advisory Committee must have
intended for judges to sanction attorneys only in the face of "bad
faith."122 The court supported its conclusion with policy arguments,
noting that to rule otherwise would deter zealous and creative
lawyering. 123
The Pennie & Edmonds decision cannot be reconciled with the
Rule's text or its history. The Pennie & Edmonds court's reliance on
the Advisory Committee's "akin to contempt" language contradicts the
plain language of Rule 11, which indicates only one standard for
sanction imposition. Moreover, the addition of a "safe harbor" is a
mere procedural change, and it is unlikely that the Advisory
Committee meant to bring about a change in the substantive mens rea
standards for Rule 11 without comment. Although the Pennie &
Edmonds court limited its holding to situations in which the court
does not offer a safe harbor, this cabining is illusory.
Finally, the Pennie & Edmonds majority's policy concerns are
assuaged without difficulty. Because research indicates that judges
impose sua sponte sanctions far less frequently than attorney-
initiated sanctions, 124  it is unlikely that an "objective
unreasonableness" standard would deter creative and zealous
lawyering. Furthermore, whereas the Advisory Committee suggested
the 1993 amendments to limit extensive Rule 11 satellite litigation, a
requirement that the court find bad faith may in fact trigger an
additional judicial hearing, thus thwarting one of the main purposes
of the 1993 amendments. The following section of this Note explores
these criticisms of the Second Circuit's approach.
1. Reliance on Advisory Committee Notes at the Expense of the Text
The Second Circuit based its standard on imprecise Advisory
Committee language and, therefore, misread the Committee's intent.
The decision highlighted an Advisory Committee Note indicating that
"[s]ince show cause orders will ordinarily be issued only in situations
that are akin to a contempt of court, the rule does not provide a 'safe
121. Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 89-91 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's
note (1993)). The court specifically noted that a finding of contempt requires a heightened mens
rea standard. Id. at 94-95.
122. Id. at 90.
123. Id. at 90-91.
124. See Hirt, supra note 8, at 1035-36 (concluding, based on his own research, that sua
sponte "rulings represent a small number of decisions relative to the number of decisions in
which courts have considered motions filed by a party").
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harbor' to a litigant for withdrawing a claim, defense, etc., after a
show cause order has been issued on the court's own initiative." 125 The
Second Circuit interpreted "akin to contempt" to mean that the mental
state applicable to judge-initiated sanctions is "bad faith."126 However,
Rule l1's text does not make this distinction.
First, the Advisory Committee's use of the word "ordinarily"
implies that only in extraordinary circumstances will courts grant
show cause orders in situations that are not akin to contempt of
court.1 27 The word "ordinarily" thus specifically carves out room for
judicial discretion in extraordinary situations. Moreover, the Advisory
Committee's use of an explanatory simile does not necessarily indicate
that the standards should be identical. "Akin to contempt" does not
necessarily require the same standard as contempt.128  Some
commentators argue that Rule 11 court-initiated sanctions are not
identical to contempt sanctions because "each of these sanctions has a
distinct purpose behind it."129 For instance, Jeff Goland argues that
because "[t]he purpose of contempt sanctions is either punitive-to
vindicate the authority of the court, or remedial-to force a party to
comply with a court order or to compensate the complainant," the
goals of each method should inform their application.1 30 Thus, where
Rule 11 seeks to deter, courts can better achieve this goal by
demanding a high standard. 131
Moreover, Judge Underhill's Pennie & Edmonds dissent offered
an alternative interpretation of the Advisory Committee's language.
The dissent noted that the word "ordinarily" is "predictive, not
restrictive; the reference to contempt describes the seriousness of the
conduct likely to prompt a court to issue a show cause order initiating
sanctions proceeding, not the mens rea necessary before sua sponte
sanctions can permissibly be imposed."132 Both interpretations-that
125. Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 90 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note
(1993)).
126. Id. at 90-91. "By declining to make the 'safe harbor' provision applicable to court-
initiated show cause orders, the Committee was signaling that the unavailability of an
opportunity to withdraw or correct makes the sanction appropriate for conduct 'akin to
contempt,' conduct that traditionally requires a heightened mens rea standard." Id. at 91 n.4.
127. See Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 98 CIV 10175(JSM), 2002 WL 59434,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002) ("[T]he word 'ordinarily'... clearly implies that there would be
instances where the court would initiate Rule 11 proceedings where the conduct at issue does not
meet the standard applied to contempt of court.").
128. Goland, supra note 49, at 472 (noting that the "akin to contempt" language does not
literally mean "the same as contempt").
129. Id.
130. Id. at 472-73.
131. See infra Part IV.
132. In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 95 (2d Cir. 2003) (Underhill, J., dissenting).
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the phrase leaves room for judicial discretion or that the phrase is
predictive, and not restrictive-are more convincing than the Pennie
& Edmonds majority's contention that the sentence evinces the
Advisory Committee's intent to create separate, unidentified,
standards for each method of bringing a Rule 11 claim.
2. Mistakenly Equating Rule 1l's Structural Changes to
Substantive Changes
The Second Circuit mistakenly concluded that the 1993
amendment's structural changes indicate substantive changes in the
mens rea required for judge-imposed sanctions. As Judge Underhill's
Pennie & Edmonds dissent noted,
The fundamental flaw in the majority's interpretation of Rule 11 is that it seeks to use
procedural distinctions drawn in section (c), regarding how sanctions can be imposed
with and without a motion, to modify the substantive requirements of section (b), which
controls whether a violation of Rule 11 has occurred. Under a plain reading of Rule 11,
the procedural distinctions set forth in section (c) have no bearing whatsoever on the
state-of-mind requirement of section (b). 13 3
Judge Underhill concluded that, while judges and attorneys
initiate sanctions differently, this distinction does not alter the state of
mind required for each method. Thus, Rule 1 l's structure implies that
"when" and "how" courts impose Rule 11 sanctions are unrelated
decisions.
Commentators agree with Underhill's conclusion. Attorney
Gregory Joseph argues that instead of changing the mens rea
requirements for sua sponte sanctions, the Advisory Committee "set
limits in Rule 11(c)(2) as to the nature of the sanctions that may be
imposed sua sponte. 134 For example, the Rule notes that the court
cannot ordinarily award attorney's fees in the sua sponte situation. 35
However, Joseph highlights Pennie & Edmonds' ironic implication: if
judges invite sanctions motions from opposing counsel because they
are wary to issue their own, judges can then impose monetary
sanctions and circumvent the Rule's (c)(2) limitations. Reading the
Rule to preclude judicial sanctions in the face of negligence encourages
such absurd results.
133. Id. at 94.
134. Gregory P. Joseph, Sua Sponte Sanctions, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 14, 2003, at B6.
135. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)(B) ("Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's
initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or
,settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be
sanctioned.").
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Although the Pennie & Edmonds majority framed its holding
as limited to situations in which the court does not afford the attorney
the twenty-one-day safe harbor, "[t]he impact of Pennie is broader
than may appear."136 Judges will be most likely to issue sanctions in
precisely those situations in which there can be no twenty-one-day
safe harbor (i.e., "when the court has already disposed of a claim,
defense or position because the offender can no longer withdraw it"137).
Thus, the Pennie & Edmonds majority is restricting the impact of
Rule 11 sanctions precisely when our judiciary could find them most
useful-that is, when the opposing attorney is no longer likely to take
action on her own.
3. Policy Rationale
In addition to relying on a questionable reading of the Advisory
Committee Notes, the Second Circuit based its "bad faith" standard on
policy arguments insufficient to justify its reading of the amendments.
The Pennie & Edmonds majority supported its conclusion by arguing
both that an objective standard deters creative lawyering and that
when attorneys do not have a safe-harbor, and thus cannot withdraw
or change their filings, fairness demands a finding of bad faith before
sanctions are imposed.138
Because courts rarely impose sua sponte sanctions, however,
the argument that an objective bad faith standard would deter
creative lawyering is unpersuasive. The Pennie & Edmonds majority
specifically worried that lawyers would withhold nonfrivolous
submissions for fear of sanction. 13 Such worries led it to conclude that
a "vigorous adversary process is better served by avoiding the
inhibiting effect of an 'objectively unreasonable' standard applied to
unchallenged submissions."'140 Although the court's goal is laudable,
research suggests that it overestimated the impact of an objective
standard.
Multiple empirical studies have highlighted the rarity of judge-
imposed sanctions. 41 Additionally, appellate courts have indicated a
willingness to overturn sua sponte imposed sanctions that appear to
136. Joseph, supra note 134.
137. Id.
138. Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 90-91.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 91.
141. See id. at 95 n.1 (Underhill, J., dissenting) (citing BURBANK, supra note 25, at 57;
THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 76 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1988))
(referencing additional research indicating that judges rarely impose sua sponte sanctions).
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stifle creativity. 142 As the Young court noted, while "judges must be
especially careful where they are both prosecutor and judge[,]...
careful appellate review is the answer to this concern."143 Because the
empirical data indicate that judges are hesitant to impose sua sponte
sanctions, the Pennie & Edmonds majority cannot reasonably contend
that lawyers would be deterred from creative lawyering.
The Pennie & Edmonds majority also expressed concern that,
lacking a safe harbor, fairness demands that judge-imposed sanctions
adhere to a bad faith standard. 144 This distinction, however, ignores
the safe harbor's purpose. As the Young court recognized, the purpose
of the safe harbor provision "is to allow a party to privately withdraw
a questionable contention without fear that the withdrawal will be
viewed by the court as an admission of a Rule 11 violation."145 Where a
secondary goal is to "protect the courts from the burden of deciding
numerous, often unnecessary, Rule 11 motions," the judiciary need not
worry that courts will be part of the problem.1 46 Because the Advisory
Committee clearly defined the purpose of the safe harbor, courts
should not read into it a backdoor intention to alter liability
standards.
B. The First and Fifth Circuits: Concerns About Fairness and Chilling
Creative Claims
Critics voice two primary concerns against the "objective
unreasonableness" standard. First, critics emphasize potential
conflicts of interest when a court acts as both prosecutor and judge. 147
Second, despite the infrequency with which judges impose sanctions
sua sponte, there is some evidence that the threat of Rule 11 sanctions
may deter "creative lawyering," particularly in civil rights cases.
148
142. See, e.g., Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2003)
(holding that while an in limine motion made by a German defendant company requesting the
exclusion of Nazi-related statements might amount to "overkill," its filing did not warrant the
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions); Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 153-54 (4th
Cir. 2002) (noting that Rule 11 "does not seek to stifle the exuberant spirit of skilled advocacy"
(citation omitted)).
143. Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2005).
144. Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 90-91.
145. Young, 404 F.3d at 39.
146. Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 100 (Underhill, J., dissenting).
147. Young, 404 F.3d at 40 (noting that "judges must be especially careful where they are
both prosecutor and judge" to impose sanctions only for serious misconduct, and not every time
lawyers make "unfounded objections, weak arguments, and dubious factual claims").
148. See Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments,
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Although both concerns are valid, they are better addressed by
methods other than requiring "bad faith" to impose judge-initiated
sanctions.
The Young decision conceded that judges "must be especially
careful where they are both prosecutor and judge" but noted that
"careful appellate review" solves this problem. 149 This dual role raises
concern that the court may lack impartiality. For example, in Young,
the district judge had issued sanctions because she disagreed with
plaintiff counsel's representation of her role in persuading parties to
sign a stipulation. 150 Where a judge is personally involved in the
incident that raises the threat of sanction, it may be impossible for the
judge to view the situation impartially. The appellate process,
however, alleviates this concern. In fact, as the court in Young
asserted, appellate review serves this same purpose in contempt
findings. 151 Therefore, there is no need to cabin the district court's
discretion where effective checks already exist within the system.
While research indicates that Rule 11 may chill "creative
lawyering" in civil rights cases, 152 courts can best assuage this fear
through the appellate process. In his article Rule 11 and Civil Rights
Litigation, Carl Tobias cites multiple studies concluding that courts
disproportionately sanction attorneys in civil rights cases.1 3 However,
because most of the research exploring the imbalance occurred before
the 1993 amendments, there is little evidence that judge-initiated
sanctions disproportionately affect civil rights claims. Moreover,
because sua sponte sanctions remain rare, "[s]tatistically, an attorney
is more likely to be sanctioned pursuant to a motion by her opponent
than as a result of a court-initiated proceeding.' ' 54 The problem, if
any, seems to lie mostly with party-initiated sanctions, and there is no
37 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 2-3, 11-24, 104-16 (2002) (providing an analysis of the effect of Rule 11 in
the civil rights context).
149. Young, 404 F.3d at 40.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Hart, supra note 148, at 143.
153. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigations, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 490 (1989)
("Professor Nelken... determined that 22.4 percent of the cases in which Rule 11 motions were
lodged from 1983 to 1985 involved civil rights, although civil rights claims comprised only 7.65
percent of the civil docket, and that defendants invoked the amendment substantially more often
than plaintiffs .... " (citing Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-
Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J.
1327, 1340 (1986))); id. (noting the Third Circuit Task Force's conclusion that, between July 1987
and June 1988, "civil rights plaintiffs and/or their lawyers were sanctioned 'at a rate.., that is
considerably higher than the rate.., for plaintiffs in non-civil rights cases'" (quoting BURBANK,
supra note 25, at 69)).
154. Goland, supra note 49, at 478.
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reason to treat judge-initiated sanctions differently. However, even if
judge-initiated sanctions are more frequent in civil rights cases, the
appellate process can serve as an appropriate check on both types of
sanctions.
The appellate court served as a check in Hunter v. Earthgrains
Co. Bakery, where the district court sought to impose sua sponte
sanctions on plaintiffs attorney in a civil rights case. 155 The appellate
court set aside the district court's sanctions, finding that the plaintiffs
attorney was not making frivolous claims but instead was arguing
that the controlling precedent had been decided incorrectly. 156 The
court noted that:
If it were forbidden to argue a position contrary to precedent, "the parties and counsel
who in the early 1950s brought the case of Brown v. Board of Ed.... might have been
thought by some district court to have engaged in sanctionable conduct for pursing their
claims in the face of the contrary precedent of Plessy v. Ferguson."
15 7
The appellate process served as an effective check on the
system in Earthgrains. But a system demanding evidence of attorney
"bad faith" offers no check on attorney negligence, save for the
opposing counsel check-the possibility that opposing counsel will
bring the Rule 11 violation to the court's attention. In Part IV, this
Note argues that this check is insufficient and, in some circumstances,
opposing counsel may have an incentive to avoid seeking sanctions.
IV. DETERRING "BAD FAITH" AND NEGLIGENT ACTION
The confusion surrounding mens rea standards for judge-
initiated sanctions results from the Advisory Committee's failure to
articulate Rule l1's purpose sufficiently. Did the Committee design
the Rule to deter both negligence and bad faith, or merely the latter?
Although numerous commentators argue that the Rule should "create
a higher standard of attorney behavior,"'158 others, such as Judge
Posner, posit that "[R]ule 11 [is] designed to shift the expenses...
caused by 'abuses' to those responsible for them."'159
The 1993 amendments enlarged district court judges'
discretion. Since 1993, judges have not been required to impose
sanctions upon finding a Rule 11 violation, but rather have the ability
to determine for themselves whether and what type of sanction to
155. 281 F.3d 144, 147-49 (2002).
156. Id. at 156.
157. Id. (quoting Blue v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 534 (4th Cir. 1990)) (internal
citations omitted).
158. BURBANK, supra note 25, at 9.
159. Id. at 10.
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impose. 160 Insofar as the Rules expand judicial discretion in one area,
they can be interpreted as broadening, not cabining, the power of the
judiciary. This interpretation supports the view that courts should not
interpret the amendments as limiting judicial discretion to issue
sanctions sua sponte where the amendments explicitly recognize
benefits associated with an independent judiciary.
Additionally, because the Advisory Committee specifically
noted that the most recent revision's purpose was to "remedy problems
that have arisen in the interpretation and application of the 1983
revision of the rule,"'161 the amendments should not be interpreted as
changing mens rea standards. The Advisory Committee's actions are
thus best viewed as a mere "tweaking" of the system. And, it is
improper to interpret the amendments as causing a change to
something as substantial as the mens rea standards of Rule 11
through procedural "tweaking."'162
On the other hand, the Advisory Committee Notes indicate
that the 1993 amendment "expands the responsibilities of litigants"
and cabins the district courts' power by "providing greater
constraints ... in dealing with infractions of the rule."'163 The Advisory
Committee states that courts normally will issue show cause orders
only "in situations that are akin to a contempt of court, [so] the rule
does not provide a 'safe harbor.' "164 This language indicates that the
1993 amendments sought to limit district judges' discretion as part of
the campaign to reduce the number of sanction claims.
Because "one's perception of purposes or goals may affect that
individual's interpretation of the duties imposed by the Rule],"'165 the
Supreme Court or the Advisory Committee should articulate the
Rule's purpose in order to encourage courts to resolve the current
circuit split. Beyond merely calling upon the Advisory Committee to
articulate a vision for Rule 11, this Note encourages the Advisory
Committee to articulate a broad vision for Rule 11. Specifically, the
Rule should deter negligence as well as punish bad faith. This Part
argues that deterring attorney negligence is not only possible, but
160. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) ("If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on
any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.").
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993).
162. Id. Indeed, the Advisory Committee notes that the 1993 revision "broadens the scope of
[the Rule's] obligation, but places greater constraints on the imposition of sanctions and should
reduce the number of motions for sanctions presented to the court." Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. BURBANK, supra note 25, at 9.
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necessary, and that district court judges are uniquely qualified to
undertake this task.
A. Deterring Negligence: Systemic and Individual Change
While critics wonder whether "stupidity [or corner-cutting can]
be deterred by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"166 research in the
tort field indicates that it is possible to deter negligence. 167 This Note
illustrates the point by drawing analogies between attorney conduct
and specific areas of tort law.
Negligence standards influence systemic organizational
change. Medical negligence occurs frequently; however, faced with
rising malpractice insurance costs, hospitals look for systemic ways to
prevent negligence before it happens. 168 Hospitals now prescribe "a
variety of new operating-room procedures, from [computerized
tracking] of surgical tools to bearing down on doctors who seem overly
eager to close up a patient before all tools have been accounted for."169
In the 1980s, Harvard doctors studied "anesthetic techniques" and
created an effective monitoring system in response to negligence
liability.170 When the costs of negligence are high, organizations invest
in the necessary research and training to change their procedures and
deter negligence.
Having learned from the medical profession, law firms could
disseminate information regarding heightened behavior standards.
Large law firms already have extensive ethics programs in place to
check for conflicts.171 Most summer associates attend training
meetings where they discuss the standards of professional
responsibility. 172 If the Advisory Committee articulated a clear
negligence standard for judge-initiated sua sponte sanctions, law
166. Id.
167. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality In The Economic Analysis Of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 443 (1994). This Note only cursorily touches on the issue of
deterrence to address recent research indicating that tort deterrents work.
168. See id. at 397-99.
169. Id. at 399.
170. Id. at 404.
171. Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119, 125-
26 (2006) ("Large law firms manage conflicts on a daily basis by imposing procedures to ensure
that information gained by an attorney regarding one client does not fall into hands of another
attorney at the firm, who might be under a duty to use the information for the benefit of another
client.").
172. What Are The 'Big Picture'Issues for Law Firms in 2007?, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS
FOR L. OFFS., Feb. 2007, at 4 ("Several firms are developing new types of [summer associate]
training programs.").
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firms already have in place the mechanisms and infrastructure
needed to teach and inform their employees about these standards.
Furthermore, research demonstrates that a "general threat of
liability" can affect individual behavior. 173 Researchers found that a
Canadian judicial decision expanding doctors' obligations to give
informed consent "resulted in fifteen percent of all surgeons spending
more time discussing surgical risks with patients."'174 More recently,
research confirmed the "effectiveness on server monitoring and of
public regulation of the server" in deterring drunk driving. 175 When
individuals are informed as to the appropriate standards, they are
likely to take specific steps to avoid personal liability.
In tort, the "general threat of liability" can be especially
effective in deterring professional misbehavior. For example, in
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, the California
Supreme Court dramatically changed the psychiatry profession when
it held that a therapist who knew that his patient was contemplating
attacking someone had a duty to warn the potential victim. 176 Studies
indicate that the California Supreme Court's decision compelled
individual therapists to modify their behavior. 177 Eight years after the
decision, the overwhelming majority of California therapists were
familiar with the case and its holding.178 Furthermore, this awareness
prompted them to change their behavior. Psychiatrists and
psychologists were "considerably more willing to notify potential
victims and also public authorities when dealing with dangerous
patients."'179  Scholars and researchers attribute Tarasoffs
effectiveness to the professional therapist organizations that
distributed information and educated members regarding their new
responsibilities. 180
These examples suggest that the threat of negligence liability
can induce organizations and individuals to adopt new methods less
likely to create unsafe situations. Like the professional organizations
that helped change therapist behavior, the legal profession possesses a
similar network of professional organizations and continuing
education requirements. Applying these lessons to the Pennie &
173. See Schwartz, supra note 167, at 401.
174. Id. at 400.
175. FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., DRINKERS, DRIVERS, AND BARTENDERS, at x (2000).
176. 551 P.2d 334, 346 (Cal. 1976).
177. See Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private
Law in Action, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 443, 451-52.
178. See id. at 461 (citing responses to a survey of California therapists).
179. Schwartz, supra note 167, at 400.
180. Givelber et al., supra note 177, at 446.
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Edmonds case, it appears likely that judge-imposed sanctions for
attorney negligence would spawn procedures and training programs to
prevent future sanctions. The district court's sanction imposition in
Pennie & Edmonds identified systemic problems associated with
larger law firms: "[tihe Court is also aware of the substantial economic
benefits that flow to 'finders[,]' the partners who find the clients, and
the pressure to please the client that is felt by the 'minders[,]' the
lawyers that actually do the client's work."'81 To solve this problem,
the lower court required Pennie & Edmonds to deliver "copies of the
court's sanction opinion to every lawyer in the firm, with a
memorandum stating that the firm adheres to the highest ethical
standards."18 2 Had the appeals court upheld these sanctions, this
requirement might have led to the type of self-assessment undertaken
by the Harvard doctors discussed above. Such a self-assessment
would have resulted in cultural changes at the firm, and perhaps even
at other law firms, to prevent future instances of negligence.
In addition to forcing big firms to change their behavior,
liability for negligent action will encourage solo practitioners to adopt
new and more cautious methods. Just as Canadian doctors responded
to increased obligations by spending more time discussing risks with
patients, solo attorneys would be more likely to look personally into
their clients' claims. And just as post-Tarasoff professional
conferences covered the new psychiatric standards, legal conferences
could discuss individual compliance with an objective reasonableness
standard. Bar and ethics classes would add the information to their
curricula. In sum, the legal profession would rely on its extensive
network of CLE classes, legal conferences, and bar associations to
disseminate information regarding new liability standards. Just as
knowledge reduced violations after Tarasoff, informed lawyers will be
less likely to engage in negligent behavior.
Because Rule 11 sanction impositions are unlikely to pose the
same financial risk as medical malpractice claims, 8 3 critics may ask
whether one truly can expect a similar deterrent effect in the legal
community. This concern is mitigated partially by two factors: (1) the
insular nature of the legal community and (2) a law firm's
181. Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 98 CIV 10175(JSM), 2002 WL 59434, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002).
182. In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 2003).
183. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF 3-4 (Jan. 8, 2004),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4968&sequence=O ('The average payment
for a malpractice claim has risen fairly steadily since 1986, from about $95,000 in that year to
$320,000 in 2002."); id. at 4. ("Each year, about 15 malpractice claims are filed for every 100
physicians, and about 30 percent of those claims result in an insurance payment.").
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reputational concerns. Law firms frequently argue before the same
judges. Firms should be unwilling to risk alienating these judges with
frequent sanction violations, because they care about their future
relationships with the court. 84 Once the Advisory Committee
articulates a clear negligence standard, attorneys will know what
behavior judges expect and behave accordingly. Moreover, law firms
rely on their reputations to recruit both law students and clients. 8 5
Sanction impositions damage reputations; thus, law firms have
economic incentives to avoid behavior likely to result in sanctions.
B. The Judicial Advantage: District Courts Are Uniquely
Positioned to Police the System
From their unique perspective, judges can police the legal
system in a way that attorneys cannot. The Supreme Court has noted
that district court judges "on the front lines of litigation" are "best
acquainted with the local bar's litigation practices and thus best
suited to determine when a sanction is warranted."'1 6 Limiting trial
judges' ability to impose sanctions for objective unreasonableness
means that only an attorney's opposing counsel can police the
profession for negligent acts-a result replete with potential pitfalls.
First, the court, more than any individual litigant, has the
greatest incentive to "weed out ... abuses" and "improve its dispute-
resolving function."'1 7 As the district court's decision in Pennie &
Edmonds notes, because "the Court as an institution has a far greater
interest in weeding out abuses than does any individual litigant, there
is no reason not to apply the well-established 'objective
reasonableness' standard to Rule 11 proceedings initiated by the
Court."'88 In fact, individual attorneys, as players in the court, may be
184. See W. Bradley Wendel, Regulation of Lawyers Without the Code, the Rules, or the
Restatement: Or, What Do Honor and Shame Have to Do with Civil Discovery Practice?, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1567, 1568 (2003) ("[T]here are nonlegal, generally informal mechanisms
available by which lawyers control one another, from within the profession, rather than relying
on formal, legal, externally imposed systems of rules.").
185. Id. at 1573 ("[L]awyers are concerned with maintaining good relationships with
opposing counsel, keeping their present clients happy, attracting future business, and winning
the favor of judges who preside over their cases. Because they have these concerns, lawyers are
sensitive to informal sanctions such as gossip and 'war stories' that might contribute to their
reputations for aggressiveness or cooperativeness, retaliation by opposing counsel for
uncooperative behavior, and the loss of credibility with the trial judge, which might result in
losing a close call on a motion or evidentiary ruling.").
186. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990).
187. Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 98 CIV 10175(JSM), 2002 WL 59434, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002).
188. Id.
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reluctant to bring sanction claims. Attorneys may fear antagonizing
the court with delay. An attorney's unwillingness to risk alienating a
judge highlights the importance of the district judge's participation.
Restricting judge-imposed sanctions solely to instances of bad
faith leaves the fox guarding the hen house in matters of attorney
negligence. For example, Professor Suzanna Sherry worries that
repeat offenders will ignore each other's violations "out of a
willingness to play along, a fear of later retaliation, or an
unwillingness to risk antagonizing the judge or delaying the
proceedings." 189 A small law firm may not be willing to risk
antagonizing an established and powerful opponent, such as Pennie &
Edmonds. Enabling a judge to respond with sanctions in this instance
takes the pressure off attorneys who may not have the political capital
to bring a Rule 11 claim.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit's bad faith standard chills the
willingness of judges to impose sanctions in cases on the margin. "The
[objective] reasonableness standard.., allows courts to impose
sanctions that might deter future violations, without having to call
into question the good faith of the sanctioned party."'190 As it stands in
the Second Circuit, a judge imposing sua sponte sanctions must assert
that an attorney acted in bad faith. This accusation's severity makes it
more likely that judges will assume, in marginal cases, that the
attorney acted in good faith. Attorneys will take advantage of this
ethical no-man's land. The result could be a race to the bottom in
which the losers are the profession and the clients.
A bad faith standard also presents difficult proof issues.
Scholars in diverse disciplines recognize that objective requirements
streamline the factfinder's job.191 Moreover, when the 1938 version of
the Rule required a finding of bad faith, scholars conceded that the
standard rendered the Rule toothless. 192
The district court's sanction imposition against Pennie &
Edmonds highlights courts' unwillingness to call into question the
good faith of a well-respected law firm. The district court took pains to
note that it "recognize[d] that the respondent firm, Pennie &
Edmonds, enjoys a good reputation in the New York legal community,
and the Court [did] not dispute counsel's assertion that they acted
189. Sherry, supra note 6, at 133.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, A Utilitarian Theory of Duress, 84 IOWA L. REV. 275, 326
(1999) ("[A]s a practical matter, objective standards reduce the possibility of fraud and
obviate the problems of proof inherent in first-person testimonials regarding their
motivation.").
192. See Hirt, supra note 8, at 1009-10.
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with subjective good faith."193 The court's reluctance to impeach a law
firm with a "good reputation" underscores the importance of the
negligence standard-a standard that allows a court to sanction
without labeling an attorney's behavior in "bad faith."
V. CONCLUSION
The Advisory Committee has never sufficiently articulated
Rule ll's purpose. From its earliest incarnation as a procedural
signing requirement through the 1993 amendments, the Advisory
Committee has not explicitly described a coherent vision for the rule-
whether Rule 11 is designed to deter negligence or punish bad faith.
Left to their own devices, individual courts and judges have brought
their own interpretations to the table, resulting in the current circuit
split.
Pennie & Edmonds highlights the type of behavior that will
occur if the Advisory Committee or the Supreme Court does not
resolve this question in the First Circuit's favor. Because research
demonstrates that accountability contributes to both organizational
and individual behavior change, Rule 11 could efficiently police the
legal community if courts strengthen their interpretation of the Rule.
However, systemic problems associated with the larger law firms will
continue and worsen if judges cannot bring their judgment to bear on
negligent attorney action. As the district court noted in Pennie &
Edmonds, "increasing attention has been focused on lesser sanctions
as a means of fine-tuning our litigation system to weed out some of its
abuses and to improve its dispute-resolving function."194 Without a
negligence standard, courts have only a blunt tool-the contempt
standard. To tie courts' hands in this matter is akin to creating a
police system that permits only citizen's arrests. District courts "on
the front line of litigation" have insight, knowledge, and judgment to
offer, and the appellate courts should embrace the wealth of their
offerings.
Sybil Louise Dunlop
193. Patsy's Brand, 2002 WL 59434, at *1.
194. Id. at *6.
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